The UK has faced a major challenge from surging English Channel small boat arrivals since 2018. This report examines crossing motivations (lack of safe routes), policy effectiveness (e.g., Illegal Migration Act, Rwanda plan), and their financial/humanitarian impacts.
Deterrence strategies have shown limited success, worsening humanitarian concerns, and inefficiencies. A balanced approach integrating border management, legal pathways, and international cooperation is vital for a humane solution.
Defining Irregular Migration Across the English Channel
English Channel migrant crossings refer to unauthorized entry into the UK via Dover, termed “irregular migration.” While historically significant small boat arrivals only began in late 2018, now they are the primary method.
This high visibility has created an “emotionally charged crisis.” Despite intense focus on “stopping the boats,” this is driven more by symbolic border control than actual numbers. Government rhetoric disproportionately targets this route, framing it as a “crisis” to justify controversial policies.
Annual English Channel Migrant Arrivals and Average Occupancy (2018-2025)
The average boat occupancy and annual trends are summarized in the table below:
Year |
Total Detected Arrivals (Small Boats) |
Percentage Change from Previous Year |
Average People per Boat |
| 2018 | 299 | N/A | 7 |
| 2019 | 1,843 | +516.4% | 11 |
| 2020 | 8,466 | +359.3% | 13 |
| 2021 | 28,526 | +236.9% | 28 |
| 2022 | 45,774 | +60.4% | 41 |
| 2023 | 29,437 | -35.60% | 49 |
| 2024 | 36,816 | +25.0% | 53 |
| 2025 (Provisional, as of end May) | 13,617 | +31% (vs. same period 2024) | 54 (as of March 2025) |
Note: Data for 2025 is provisional and represents figures up to the end of May. The percentage change for 2025 is compared to the same period in the previous year.
Drivers of Dangerous Channel Crossings
Individuals undertake dangerous Channel crossings due to perilous situations like war, persecution, famine, poverty, and severe transit abuse (e.g., in Libya), often feeling they have “no other choice.” A critical factor is the absence of safe and legal asylum routes to the UK, as existing schemes are notably limited and tied to specific circumstances.
Reasons for Choosing the UK and Role of Smugglers
Migrants choose the UK for varied reasons, even after transiting “safe” countries. Key factors include family reunification, English language familiarity for rebuilding lives, and perceived colonial ties.
Unsafe conditions or asylum rejections elsewhere also compel onward journeys. Critically, the lack of official, accessible routes forces individuals to rely on people smugglers, who exploit their vulnerability and profit from human desperation.
Asylum Claim Trends and Processing in the UK
The vast majority of small boat arrivals in the UK apply for asylum (93% between 2018 and 2024), consistently remaining high. Initial asylum decisions show a high success rate (75% by March 2024; 47% initial grants by March 2025), with nearly two-thirds of 2024 crossers expected to be recognized as refugees.
Successful appeals (48% in 2024) further indicate valid claims. Despite this, cases face significant delays, with over 109,000 awaiting initial decisions by March 2025, and the total caseload has quadrupled since 2014 to 224,700 by June 2024.
Limited Legal Pathways & Brexit Impact
The lack of an asylum visa and the UK’s post-Brexit withdrawal from the Dublin III Regulation significantly hinder irregular migration management. This means asylum seekers cannot apply from outside the UK, and the mechanism to return them to their first EU entry point is lost.
UK Policy Fuels Smuggling
The UK’s policy of requiring in-country asylum claims, combined with a severe lack of safe legal routes, inadvertently strengthens people smugglers. Genuine refugees, evidenced by high asylum success rates, are forced into dangerous, illegal journeys, thereby empowering criminal gangs.
Inefficient Deterrence & Ethical Concerns
High asylum claim success rates, coupled with delays and appeals, show that a deterrence-focused approach lacks efficient processing, is costly, and erodes trust. Many arrivals are genuine refugees, but the system is burdened by immense backlogs (109,000+ waiting).
UNHCR warns that denying asylum access creates limbo and increases costs, paradoxically hindering removals. Deterrence-first policies are thus ethically questionable, inefficient, and worsen existing issues.
The Illegal Migration Act of 2023 and the Nationality and Borders Act of 2022 are legislative measures.
Since 2018, the UK government has implemented tough measures to deter Channel crossings. More severe sanctions for unauthorized immigration were introduced by the Nationality and Borders Act 2022.
The Illegal Migration Act 2023 (IMA), though not fully commenced, is a cornerstone, declaring asylum claims inadmissible for illegal entrants and mandating their removal to a “safe third country.”
It grants powers to detain such individuals and their families with limited judicial review and permanently bars re-entry or settlement. The IMA seeks to prevent unauthorized entrance, stop smuggling, and save lives.
The Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership (MEDP)
Launched in April 2022, the Rwanda MEDP aimed to relocate illegal asylum seekers to Rwanda, with no UK return. Due to safety and human rights issues, the Supreme Court declared it illegal in November 2023.
In response, the Conservative government signed a new treaty and passed the Safety of Rwanda Act 2024, controversially deeming Rwanda safe.
The scheme cost over £700 million and was deemed more expensive than domestic processing. Upon taking office in July 2024, the Labour government cancelled the policy, redirecting funds. Only four volunteers were ever sent.
Border Force Operations and International Cooperation
The UK’s response to channel crossings heavily relies on Border Force operations and international cooperation.
Enforcement includes intelligence sharing, enhanced operations in Northern France, and tougher laws, with measures like more drone pilots and increased patrols.
The UK provides significant funding to France (€541 million) for border control and is negotiating a “one-for-one” migrant return scheme.
Post-Brexit Challenges and Partnerships
Post-Brexit, the UK lost access to key EU mechanisms like the Dublin Regulation, Frontex, Eurodac, and the Schengen Information System. While attempting to revive cooperation (e.g., Frontex Working Arrangement, interest in Eurodac/Schengen), the EU maintains a firm stance against full access for non-members.
The UK is also strengthening broader international partnerships with countries like Germany, Italy, Albania, Iraq, and Vietnam to combat smuggling. Efforts against smuggling networks involve disrupting online enablers, tackling illicit finance, and seizing equipment.
Limited Impact of Deterrence Policies on Channel Crossings
Despite political pledges, deterrence policies have had a limited impact on Channel crossings, which even increased in early 2025. Critics argue the focus is too much on deterrence and not enough on disrupting criminal networks.
Lack of clear benchmarks fuels skepticism, and proposals like the “one-for-one” deal with France are seen as ineffective deterrents.
Financial Burden and Ineffectiveness of Deterrence-First Approach
Substantial financial investment in policies like the Rwanda plan (£ 700 M+) and French agreements (€ 541 M+) has not reduced Channel crossings, indicating a policy mismatch. The Rwanda scheme, despite immense cost, sent only four volunteers and was abandoned.
This pattern suggests that a deterrence-first approach is financially burdensome and largely ineffective, failing to disrupt the smuggling business model, which thrives on a lack of safe alternatives.
Brexit’s Impact on Migration Management and International Cooperation
Brexit has paradoxically weakened the UK’s ability to manage irregular migration, severing established EU cooperation mechanisms like the Dublin Regulation. This loss forces the UK to renegotiate less comprehensive bilateral agreements.
Efforts to revive cooperation (e.g., Frontex, Eurodac) face EU reluctance for full access to a non-member, leading to a less effective and more complex operational environment and imbalanced deals compared to pre-Brexit mechanisms.
UK’s International Obligations: Refugee Convention and ECHR
The UK operates within international legal frameworks, having signed the 1951 Refugee Convention (affirming asylum rights, non-penalization for irregular entry, and non-refoulement) and applying the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (enshrining fundamental rights like life and freedom from torture). The UK Supreme Court cited an ECHR breach in its ruling against the Rwanda plan.
UNHCR Criticisms and Recommendations
The UNHCR consistently criticizes UK migration policies, deeming the Rwanda agreement “incompatible with the 1951 Convention” and the Illegal Migration Act (IMA) inconsistent with Refugee Convention obligations by barring asylum access for irregular arrivals.
They recommend repealing the IMA, implementing fair, efficient asylum procedures with prompt processing and accelerated claims, and addressing systemic issues like staffing and IT for quality decision-making.
Tension with International Law and Humanitarian Concerns
UK policies, especially the IMA and former Rwanda plan, create direct tension with international legal obligations (1951 Refugee Convention, ECHR), leading to legal challenges and humanitarian crises.
The Rwanda plan was ruled unlawful due to refoulement risks. The IMA is criticized for inconsistent asylum access. This disconnect results in human suffering (deaths, prolonged detention, poor conditions), undermining the UK’s humanitarian reputation.
The focus on deterrence, rather than humane processing, creates a costly system inflicting trauma, raising questions about the UK’s commitment to humanitarian principles.
Economic Burden of the Asylum System
Channel migrant crossings and the asylum system impose a substantial economic burden on the UK, costing approximately £3 billion annually, with nearly £8 million daily spent on hotel accommodation.
Total system costs reached £3.96 billion by 2023, doubling from the prior year and increasing sixfold since 2018. Asylum operations consistently exceed budget, averaging £2.6 billion annually.
The number of asylum seekers in contingency accommodation increased 16-fold by March 2024 since March 2020. The Rwanda program alone cost over £700 million, and a third-nation removal was projected to cost £63,000 more per person than domestic processing.
The Illegal Migration Act and Rwanda plan could trap over 100,000 people, costing taxpayers up to £6.2 billion annually for accommodation.
Lack of Access to Services and Associated Costs for Unauthorized Migrants
Unauthorized migrants are denied access to essential services like jobs, housing, and education, leading to poverty, exploitation, and illicit gig economy labor, which can depress wages. The estimated annual cost of public services for 1.2 million unauthorized migrants could reach £14.4 billion.
Public Opinion and Political Influence
Public opinion on channel crossings is a significant political factor, with polls consistently showing a strong desire for stricter government action. A late 2021 Redfield and Wilton Strategies poll found 55% of the public felt the government’s approach was “too soft.”
Migration was Boris Johnson’s worst-rated area (54% disapproval). A June 2021 YouGov poll revealed 60% believed illegal migrants should be banned from claiming asylum, and over 70% viewed Channel crossings as a “serious problem.”
This public sentiment has made the issue a central focus of government policy and political debate.
The Need for a Multifaceted Strategy
Therefore, it is evident that a multifaceted strategy that goes beyond simple enforcement and deterrence is needed to address the complexity of English Channel migrant crossings.
Indeed, the necessity for safe and legal routes, alongside improved asylum processing and enhanced international cooperation, is consistently emphasized by various proposals.
Safe & Legal Routes: Expansion Needed
Organizations like the Refugee Council advocate for expanded safe and legal routes for UK asylum, including offshore application pathways (e.g., Ukrainian-style visas). Proponents argue this undermines smugglers and prevents dangerous crossings.
While the UK has existing schemes (Mandate, Sponsorship, UKRS, country-specific routes), critics deem them too limited, calling for significant expansion and refugee visas.
Asylum System Reform for Efficiency
UNHCR urges repealing the Illegal Migration Act to align with international obligations and reduce backlogs. They recommend fair, efficient asylum procedures; prompt processing; triaging cases; and frontloading screening.
Addressing systemic issues in staffing, training, and IT is crucial for quality decisions, reducing appeals, and expediting returns for those not needing protection, thereby maintaining asylum process integrity.
Conclusion
The English Channel crossings represent a multifaceted crisis, marked by increasing arrivals and substantial costs, yet current deterrence-focused policies prove largely ineffective and ethically problematic.
A sustainable solution demands a comprehensive shift: prioritizing safe, legal routes, efficient asylum processing, and stronger international cooperation to address root causes. Without this humane, holistic approach, the challenges—and human suffering—will persist.
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